Voting institutions commonly assign di®erent weights across voters. Most analyses of such systems assume that the relative in°uence of each player is non-linear in her voting weight. We reassess this assumption with a distributive bargaining game that closely resembles the closed-rule, in¯nite-horizon Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. In equilibrium, voters with lower weights are typically perfect substitutes for voters with higher weights. Hence, each voter's power is exactly proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when su±cient numbers of high-weight voters exist. In this case, low-weight voters are relatively more powerful than high-weight voters because their probabilities of being recognized to make a proposal are equal to those of high-weight voters. These results call into question the applicability of power indices such as the Banzhaf index and Shapley-Shubik value, which are often convex in voting weights.
Introduction
Elementary microeconomic theory teaches that in competitive situations perfect substitutes have the same price. In a political setting in which votes might be traded or transferred in the formation of coalitions, one might expect the same logic to apply. If a legislator or bloc has k votes, that legislator or bloc should command a price for those votes equal to the total price of k players that each have 1 vote. Put in terms of expected payo®s, then, the player with k votes should expect to have a payo® k times as great as the payo® expected by a player with 1 vote. If \expected payo® " can be used as a measure of \power," then the player with k votes should also expect to have k times as much power as the player with 1 vote.
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In this paper, we present a straightforward model of divide-the-dollar politics that captures this intuition. We show that the non-cooperative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) leads naturally to the result that expected payo®s are proportional to voting weights.
2
1 Theorists working on this problem commonly equate power and expected payo®s. There is some debate over whether the de¯nition of power should also include the ability to change the outcome, even though the action does not result in an increase in, and may even lower, the payo® for the pivotal actor. See Felsenthal and Machover (1998) for a discussion of the issues, especially the distinction between \I-power" and \P-power". In this paper we use the terms power and expected payo®s interchangeably.
2 This is the most widely used model of legislative bargaining, and has been used extensively to study various aspects of distributive politics and government institutions. See Harrington (1989 Harrington ( , 1990a Harrington ( , 1990b , Baron (1991 Baron ( , 1996 Baron ( , 1998 , Baron and Kalai (1993) , Calvert and Dietz (1996) , Winter (1996) , Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) , Banks and Duggan (2000) , LeBlanc, Snyder and Tripathi (2000) , McCarty (2000a McCarty ( , 2000b There are two types of equilibria. The¯rst type is an \interior" equilibrium in which each player's expected payo® is equal to his share of the total voting weight. The second type is a \corner" equilibrium in which players with the largest weights have expected payo®s that are proportional to their voting weights but their shares are less than their share of the weight (so the factor of proportionality is less than one), and players with the smallest weights all receive expected payo®s greater than their shares of the total voting weight. Which type of equilibrium occurs depends on the distribution of voting weights.
The intuition is straightforward, and follows from a simple substitution argument. In the Baron-Ferejohn model, a randomly drawn legislator makes a proposal|a division of the dollar|which is then put to a vote. Proposers seeks to o®er as little of the dollar as possible to others, because they keep the residual for themselves. Suppose type-1 players have a continuation value of 2 and a voting weight of 1, while type-2 players have a continuation value of 5 and a voting weight of 2. Then rational proposers seeking to minimize the costs of the coalitions they construct will never include type-2 players in their coalitions (except, perhaps, because of \integer" issues). Proposers will substitute type-1 players for type-2 players whenever possible, since two type-1 players have the same total voting weight as one type-2 player, but a total cost that is 4/5 as much.
At a \corner" equilibrium the players can be divided into two distinct groups, de¯ned by some cuto® weight t 0 . Players with voting weights less than t 0 have expected payo®s that are greater than their shares of the total voting weights, while players with voting weights greater than (or equal to) t 0 have expected payo®s that are less than their shares of the total voting weight. All players with voting weights greater than (or equal to) t 0 have expected payo®s that are equal to some µ times their voting weight, with µ < 1. The reason weak players have expected payo®s that are greater than their shares of the voting weight is their proposal power. By assumption, this is assigned equally to all players. The corner equilibria occur when the weakest players are so weak that, even if no other proposers ever include them as coalition partners, their proposal power alone is enough to yield an expected payo® Norman (2000) , and Eraslan (2001) .
greater than their share of the voting weight.
Most theoretical and applied analyses of weighted voting employ power indices, such as the Shapley-Shubik value, the Banzhaf index, and the Deegan-Packel index.
3 These indices do not have the feature that perfect substitutes have the same price or expected value.
Rather, these indices are generally highly nonlinear in the voting weights. Many scholars see this as quite natural. One example is Lucas:
It is fallacious to expect that one's voting power is directly proportional to the number of votes he can deliver. Yet many attempts to correct inequalities merely assign weights to a delegate proportional to the number of inhabitants he represents, and it is felt that this preserves some equality at the level of the individual citizens. Paradoxically, those who advocate that they are the main bene¯ciaries of the weighted systems such as the Electoral College are very often the ones most hurt by it in terms of power indices... Power is not a trivial function of one's strength as measured by his number of votes. Simple additive or division arguments are not su±cient, but more complicated relations are necessary to understand the real distribution of in°uence (Lucas, 1978, page 184) .
Another example is Brams and A®uso:
...a measure like Banzhaf's is not only an eminently reasonable indicator of a crucial aspect of voting power|the ability of a member to change an outcome by changing its vote|but also highlights the fact that size (as re°ected by voting weights) and voting power may bear little relationship to each other (Brams and A®uso, 1985, page 138) .
The standard power indices are justi¯ed in terms of cooperative game theory or axiomatic approaches. They are based on the idea that all orderings, or winning coalitions, or minimalwinning coalitions, are equally likely to form, regardless of how expensive or cheap they are.
In contrast, under the competitive bargaining logic expensive coalitions will form rarely or not at all, and cheap coalitions will form quite often. Banzhaf (1968) , Owen (1975) , Merrill (1978) , Dreyer and Schotter (1980) , Holler (1982) , Bates and Lien (1985) , Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1986) , Rapoport and Golan (1985) , Strom, Budge, and Laver (1994) , Konig and Brauninger (1996) , and Calvo and Lasaga (1997) .
5 See Brams and A®uso (1985) , Hosli (1993) , Widgren (1994) , , Lane, Maeland, and Berg (1995) , Teasdale (1996) , Machover (1997, 2001, n.d.) , Laruelle and Widgren (1998) , Konig and Brauninger (1998) , Holler and Widgren (1999) , Garrett and Tsebelis (1999a , 1999b , Sutter (2000a Sutter ( , 2000b , Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) , and Widgren (2000) .
rule|to study weighted voting. 
Model and Results

The Model
In the model, the players are a continuum of legislators distributed uniformly on L[ 0; n), where n is a positive integer. Legislators each belong to one of T types, de¯ned by their voting weights, where 1 · T · n. A type t legislator has a voting weight w t and belongs to
We assume that weights are positive integers and that w i < w j for any i < j, with w 1 = 1. For convenience, we also assume that each L t is arranged in \increasing" order, so that legislators in [0; 1) belong to L 1 (with weight 1) and legislators in [n¡ 1; n) belong to L T (with weight w T ). Each type t is subdivided into n t non-intersecting intervals or blocs of length 1, where
The legislature works via a generalized majority rule. For any coalition of legislators C µ L, let l t (C) represent the measure of type t legislators contained within (i.e., the length of C \ L t ). Let w(C) = P T t=1 l t (C)w t represent its total voting weight, and w = w(L) = P T t=1 n t w t the combined weight of all legislators. A coalition C is winning if and only if w(C)¸w, where w¸w 2 . We denote by W the set of winning coalitions.
This formalization of the legislature, while somewhat arti¯cial, avoids a number of integer problems. For example, if the set of legislators is discrete and there are at least two types of legislators, it is possible for optimal minimum winning coalitions to be of di®erent sizes.
With a continuum of legislators, no coalition builder will ever want a coalition with weight greater than w. As the examples in Section 3 suggest, this setup does not a®ect the results substantially. 7 6 Other non-cooperative models of n-person bargaining include Selten (1981) , Binmore (1987) , Gul (1989) , Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta (1993) , and Moldovanu and Winter (1995) , Hart and Mas Colell (1996) , and Okada (1996) . To our knowledge, none of these has been applied to the study of legislative politics. Merlo and Wilson (1995) study distributive politics under unanimity rule. Finally, other cooperative solution concepts applied to weighted voting games include bargaining sets, bargaining aspirations, the kernel, and the competitive solution. See, for example, Scho¯eld (1976 Scho¯eld ( , 1978 Scho¯eld ( , 1982 Scho¯eld ( , 1987 , McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer (1978) , Bennett (1983a , 1983b ), and Holler (1987 . 7 We hope that this simpli¯cation proves useful for future work on distributive politics in legislatures.
We consider the closed-rule, divide-the-dollar game studied by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) .
In each period, the moves are as follows. Nature randomly draws a proposer from the set of legislators. This draw is uniform on L and i.i.d. across periods, so that the probability of the proposer belonging to any given bloc is always 1=n. The proposer proposes a division of the dollar, subject to the constraint that all members in the proposer's bloc receive the same payo® as herself. 8 The proposer can thus be thought of as the bloc's \spokesperson" or \representative." All legislators then vote for or against the proposal. If the proposal receives weight w in support, then the dollar is divided and the game ends. If the proposal is rejected, then a new proposer is randomly drawn and the game continues. We look at the in¯nite-horizon game, with no discounting. The game can be treated as a sequence of identical subgames, where each subgame begins with nature's move to draw a proposer. To conserve on notation, we omit reference to time periods except where necessary.
In each period, the strategy for a proposer in bloc j of type t can be represented as follows:
where z represents the position of a generic legislator and k¸0 is the payment o®ered to all members of the proposer's bloc. Each legislator's voting strategy is then simply a function mapping the o®ered amount to a probability of voting:
We impose two standard tie-breaking rules. First, legislators who are indi®erent between the o®ered proposal and continuing to the next period vote for the proposal. 9 Second, legislators vote as if they were pivotal. Because of the continuum of legislators, a measure zero set of legislators cannot a®ect the outcome, but voting`non-pivotally' is clearly weakly dominated for any individual legislator, and strictly so for any set of legislators of positive measure.
Results
8 Since each bloc consists of only legislators of a single type, only the proposer's bloc, and not her exact location, is relevant. We make this assumption so that each legislator's \recognition probability" is positive. Otherwise, the continuation payo® of each legislator will be 0.
9 It is straightforward to verify that assuming otherwise would make the proposer's maximization problem not well de¯ned.
We look for symmetric, stationary, subgame perfect equilibria (SSSPE's). Symmetry means that all players of the same type are treated symmetrically (although di®erent types may be treated di®erently). Stationarity means that each player uses history-independent strategies at all proposal-making stages, and voting strategies that only depend on the current proposal. SSSPE's will have the following properties. By symmetry, for each type t, the continuation value of all type-t players at the beginning of each subgame will be equal. By stationarity, these values will also be the same for each subgame. Let v t be the continuation value of type-t players at the beginning of each subgame.
These restrictions allow us to narrow the set of proposals that may occur in equilibrium.
At an SSSPE, the proposer must o®er at least v t to a type-t player in order to obtain that player's support. Since proposers wish to minimize their o®ers, every legislator (other than those in the proposer's bloc) must be o®ered either v t or 0 in equilibrium. For each coalition C, let v(C) = P T t=1 v t l t (C) be the total \cost" of C. For a proposer in bloc L tj , let v t = min fCjL tj µC;C2Wg v(CnL tj ) be the minimum total payment proposed to coalition partners outside of L tj . All legislators in L tj then receive 1¡ v t . Also, let q t be the average probability that a legislator in L tj is chosen as a coalition partner, given that someone outside of L tj is the proposer.
10 Then,
Or,
The following proposition characterizes the SSSPE's for the \interior" case. In any equilibrium the expected payo® (continuation value) of each legislator is proportional to his voting weight.
Proposition 1. Suppose w · w + n ¡ 1. Then at any SSSPE, v t = w t =w for all t.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the equilibrium of Proposition 1, v t = w=w ¡ v t = (w¡w t )=w for all t, so we can solve 10 Note that v t and q t do not depend on j, since by symmetry they are identical across blocs within L t .
equation (1) for q t to obtain
Clearly, q t is strictly increasing in w t . Thus, the main reason types with higher voting weights receive higher expected payo®s in equilibrium is that proposers are more likely to choose them as coalition partners. Note also that in the case of simple majority rule (w = w=2), the condition in Proposition 1 becomes w · 2(n ¡1).
The next proposition characterizes the SSSPE in the \corner" case. In this case, the types with the smallest voting weights have expected payo®s greater than their relative weight, while those with the largest weights receive expected payo®s lower than their relative weight.
Also, for all types t¸t 0 , expected payo®s are proportional to voting weights.
Proposition 2. Suppose w > w + n ¡ 1. Then all SSSPE have the following properties: (i) there is a type t 0 > 1 and a number µ < 1 such that v t = µw t =w for all t¸t 0 and v t > w t =w for all t < t 0 , and (ii) q t = 0 for all t < t 0 .
These equilibria might or might not be \unique," depending on the distribution of voting weights. For some con¯gurations there is a unique type of equilibrium|that is, a unique cuto® value t 0 . For other con¯gurations there are several types of equilibria, each associated with a di®erent cuto® values.
Discussion
In a corner equilibrium, the high-voting-weight type are \underpaid" relative to their voting weight, while it is the low-weight types that are \overpaid." This is the opposite of what tends to happen for many of the power indices.
The intuition behind this result is that equal proposal probabilities disproportionately bene¯t voters with low weights. A corner equilibrium occurs when the expected payo® to some low-weight voter is greater than his share of the weight, even when no other proposers ever choose him as a coalition partner. The high payo® that occurs in the event that he (or someone in his bloc) is proposer determines his entire expected payo®. This suggests that if recognition probabilities were adjusted to re°ect voting weights, linearity in expected payo®s and voting weights would be restored. The following result establishes the existence of such equilibria.
Remark. Suppose w > w + n ¡ 1 and the recognition probability of each type t voter is w t =w. Then there exists an SSSPE such that v t = w t =w for all t.
We therefore expect that payo®s proportional to voting weights will be more likely when recognition probabilities follow the same pattern as voting weights.
Note also that corner equilibria are more likely to occur when the threshold for victory w is low, since lower values of w imply greater bene¯ts to being proposer. Thus, we expect linear payo®s when w is high, that is, when the collective choice rule is supermajoritarian.
An open rule also makes proposing less valuable, since the proposer must o®er higher payo®s to his coalition partners and must often build supermajorities to reduce the probability of counter-proposals (see Baron and Ferejohn, 1989) . Thus, we also expect that linear payo®s will be more likely under an open rule.
Finally, the following comparative statics results follow immediately. Except for types that \corner", a small increase in voting weight always increases a player's expected payo®, but a small increase in proposal probability does not. For the types that corner (these are the types with low voting weight), a small increase in voting weight carries no bene¯t (since these types will still \never" be included in a coalition), but a small increase in proposal probability increases the expected payo®.
Examples of Finite Legislatures
The propositions above apply to in¯nitely large legislatures. However, as the following examples show, the basic logic underlying the propositions holds for¯nite legislatures as well, even legislatures with few players.
Before proceeding with the examples, we must consider the matter of voting weights. In the continuum case studied in section 2, each weighted voting game has a unique representation (up to a set of measure zero). If we change the weights of any set of players with positive measure, then we change the set of winning coalitions, producing a di®erent game.
Each¯nite weighted voting game, however, can be represented by many di®erent vectors of weights|that is, there are di®erent vectors of weights that produce the exact same set of winning coalitions. Which weights should we choose to characterize a given¯nite weighted voting game?
A weighted voting game is homogeneous if all minimal winning coalitions have exactly the same total voting weight. Isbell (1956) shows that if a game has a homogeneous representation, then this representation is unique, and the voting weights are minimum integer weights. Note that in the continuum formulation in section 2, the weights are homogeneous. Table 1 compares the Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, and expected payo®s under the competitive bargaining game, for all strong four-,¯ve-, and six-player weighted voting games.
11 We present each game in terms of its minimum integer weights. We calculated the unique expected payo®s supportable by SSSPE's to all of these games. 12 We also computed the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices for these games.
Based on the results in the table, we make the following conjectures for¯nite games: For homogeneous games that satisfy the conditions of proposition 1, expected payo®s will be linear in the homogeneous weights. For homogeneous games that satisfy the conditions of proposition 2, expected payo®s will di®er from the homogeneous weights as in proposition 2.
For non-homogeneous games that satisfy the conditions of proposition 1, expected payo®s will be linear in the minimum integer weights. For non-homogeneous games the conditions of proposition 2, expected payo®s will di®er from the minimum integer weights as in proposition 2. We stress that these are only conjectures. However, as the table shows, they hold for all strong four-,¯ve-, and six-player weighted voting games.
The right-hand side of the table shows how di®erent the power indices are from the expected payo®s of the competitive bargaining game. In many cases the di®erences are slight, but in some cases they are quite large|see, for example, the¯ve-player game with weights (3; 1; 1; 1; 1), and the six-player game with weights (4; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) and (4; 3; 3; 1; 1; 1).
In all cases, the expected payo®s of the players with the largest weights are lower than their Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices (except one case where they are the same). In all but 11 A simple game is strong if the complement of a losing coalition is always winning|so, there are no blocking coalitions.
12 The uniqueness proofs are case-by-case and repetitious so we omit them.
one case, the expected payo®s of the players with the smallest weights are lower than their power indices.
An Application: Council of Ministers of the EC (EU)
The basic logic developed here has a wide range of applications. We consider here the weighted-voting scheme used for the Council of Ministers of the European Community, as that has been the subject of extensive debate. For simplicity of exposition we consider the weights under the original EC. In the original EC, the distribution of votes was France 4, Germany 4, Italy 4, Belgium 2, the Netherlands 2, and Luxembourg 1. Also, the Council uses Quali¯ed Majority Voting. In the original EC, at least 12 of 17 votes were required to pass a measure. Brams and A®uso (1985) , , Felsenthal and Machover (1997, n.d.) , and others have calculated the power indices for the Council in each of these periods. The expected payo®s in this game are determined by two equations. First, the expected payo®s must sum to 1. So, 3V A + 2V B + V C = 1. Let V B = µ. Then V C = 1 ¡ 8µ. Second, the player with weight zero retains a certain amount of value if it is chosen. Because the type C player (Luxembourg) is a dummy player its integer weight is 0. However, it still might be chosen as a proposer (with probability 1/6) and this proposal power gives it a positive expected payo®. If Luxembourg is chosen as proposer, it must include all three type A players or any two of the type A players and both type B players to have the necessary coalition size. In equilibrium, this player will pay the price of the 6 votes (i.e., 6µ) and keep the remainder. As a result, the expected value for the type C player is V C = 1 ¡ 6µ. Using these two equations, µ = 5=42, and expected payo®s may be calculated readily.
13
The expected payo®s to the competitive bargaining game nearly equal the weights. The This might re°ect the subtle nature of power, or it might re°ect problems with the Banzhaf index, such as those noted by Holler (1982 Holler ( , 1987 and Garrett and Tsebelis (2001) . The Baron-Ferejohn model apparently does not have this feature. Luxembourg's vote share fell and its power fell. It is ultimately an empirical matter whether this model better captures the essence of collective decision making in the EU. Ultimately, the value of the model rests on its empirical validity. Analyses of coalitions governments provide some validation for the linear result. Browne and Franklin (1973) and Browne and Frendreis (1980) ¯nd that the distribution of cabinet seats to parties is linear in the parties' seat shares, rather than non-linear, as predicted by power indices. Though not direct tests of the model developed here, these empirical¯ndings are broadly consistent with our argument that the expected payo®s will typically be proportional to seat shares.
Discussion
Further evidence for a fairly linear relationship between expected payo®s and voting weights comes from analyses of the distribution of economic bene¯ts. A growing literature examines the association between the distribution of public expenditures across geographic 14 The minimum integer weights are (6; 6;6; 6;3; 3; 2; 2; 1), and the quota is 25 votes. These are the relevant weights for the analysis of the game, and the equilibrium is at a corner. Our intuition is that an open rule will act like a supermajority requirement (w > w=2)|it will lower proposal power, making corner equilibria less likely and the interior equilibrium is more likely. Second, the model can be applied to more complicated organizations, such legislatures with committees and to bicameral legislatures. Third, we hope to extend the analysis to allow actors to have more complicated preferences that include distribution of expenditures or positions and \spatial" policy. Strom, Budge, and Laver (1994) , for example, look at modi¯ed Shapley values where constraints are placed on which coalitions can form due to insurmountable ideological di®erences.
Finally, this analysis bears directly on debate over the meaning and nature of power. Mixed proposal strategies for all players that sustain the equilibrium are as follows. Let q t be represented more generally as
, where ½ ijt is the equilibrium probability that a legislator of type t is included in a coalition formed by a proposer in bloc j of type i.
15 Let L t be written [I t ; ¹ I t ), where
i=1 n i and ¹ I t = I t +n t , and let°» U[0; 1].
Given ½ ijt , if i 6 = t the proposer o®ers v t to the following members of L t :
The proposer o®ers 0 to all other members of type t. If i = t, then the proposer o®ers v t to legislators in L t nL tj in an identical fashion, and 0 to all other members of type t.
(Uniqueness) We now show that there is no equilibrium where v t 6 = w t =w for any type t. The relative cost of each type can be expressed as v t w=w t . If v t w=w t > v r w=w r , then type-t players cost more per unit of voting weight than type-r players, and are therefore strictly less desirable as coalition partners. Let µ = min t fv t w=w t g · 1 be the relative price of the cheapest types, and let T C = ft j v t w=w t = µg be the set of cheapest types, and let T E = ft j v t w=w t > µg be the set of other (i.e., more expensive) types. We show that T E 6 = ; leads to a contradiction.
First, note that q t < 1 for all t 2 T C . To see this, let v = min fCjC2Wg v(C) represent the cost of the least-costly winning coalitions. Then v t = v¡v t for all t 2 T C (since for any t 2 T C , a type-t proposer will build a coalition that costs exactly v, including the proposer's own bloc). Equation (1) can then be written as v t = (1¡v)=((n¡1)(1¡q t )). If q t = 1, then
Next, note that if q t < 1 for all t 2 T C , then w(T C ) > w¡ w T (i.e., the set of legislators with types in T C is decisive). Thus, proposers always choose all of their coalition partners from T C , and v = µw=w.
Next, since proposers always buy minimal winning coalitions drawn from T C , for t 2 T E , q t = 0 and v t = v¡µw t =w. Substituting in equation (1) then yields:
Also, as noted above,
From equation (1), v s = (1¡v s )=n for all types s 2 T E . Also, v t is strictly increasing in q t , so v r > (1¡ v r )=n for all r 2 T C . Thus, v r = w r µ=w > v s > w s µ=w, and all types in T E must have smaller voting weights than all types in T C . That is, there exists a cuto® type t 0 > 1 such that T E = f1; :::; t 0 ¡1g and T C = ft 0 ; :::; T g.
The sum of the continuation values must be 1, so: (3) holds if and only if Ã(t 0 ) > 0. Note that Ã(1) = 0. Taking di®erences,
When t 0 = 1, the term in square brackets is non-positive if w · w +n¡1. Also, the term in square brackets is decreasing in t 0 (since w 1 < w 2 < : : : < w T ). So, if w · w +n ¡1, then Ã(t 0 ) is weakly decreasing in t 0 , for all t 0¸1 . Since Ã(1) = 0, this implies that Ã(t 0 ) · 0 for all t 0 > 1.
Thus, at any equilibrium we must have v t = w t =w for all t. So, the equilibrium is unique, up to di®erences in the probabilities of choosing di®erent coalition partners that do not a®ect the players' expected payo®s. QED Proof of Proposition 2. (i) First we show that there is no`proportional' equilibrium; i.e.,
for some t and constant´, v t 6 =´w t =w. Note¯rst that´= 1; otherwise, P T t=1 n t v t 6 = 1. Suppose that v t = w t =w for all t. Then v t = w=w ¡ v t = (w ¡w t )=w, and by equation (1),
But since w 1 = 1, the assumption w > w +n ¡1 implies that
Thus the relative prices of types must vary. As in the proof of Proposition 1 let µ = min t fv t w=w t g · 1 be the relative price of the cheapest types, and let T C = ft j v t w=w t = µg be the set of cheapest types, and let T E = ft j v t w=w t > µg be the set of other (i.e., more expensive) types.
We claim that q r < 1 for all r 2 T C and q s = 0 for all s 2 T E . To see this, let v = min fC2Wg v(C). Then v r = v¡ v r for all r 2 T C . Equation (1) can then be written as
. If q r = 1, then v r = 1, a contradiction. Next, note that if q r < 1 for all r 2 T C , then w(T C ) > w ¡ w T (i.e., the set of legislators with types in T C is decisive). Thus, proposers always choose all of their coalition partners from T C . Thus, v = µw=w, and q s = 0 and v s = v¡µw s =w = µ(w ¡w s )=w for all s 2 T E .
Substituting into equation (1), v s = (1¡ v s )=n for all types s 2 T E . Also, v t is strictly increasing in q t , so v r > (1¡v r )=n for all r 2 T C . Thus, v r = w r µ=w > v s > w s µ=w, and all types in T E must have smaller voting weights than all types in T C . That is, there exists a cuto® type t 0 > 1 such that T E = f1; :::; t 0 ¡ 1g and T C = ft 0 ; :::; T g.
Mixed proposal strategies for all players that sustain the equilibrium are as follows. Let q t be represented more generally as
, where ½ ijt is the equilibrium probability that a legislator of type t (t 2 T C ) is included in a coalition formed by a proposer in bloc j of type i. Let L t be written [I t ; ¹ I t ), where
i=1 n i and ¹ I t = I t +n t , and let°» U[0; 1]. Given ½ ijt , if i 6 = t the proposer o®ers v t to the following members of L t :
The proposer o®ers 0 to all other members of type t. If i = t, then the proposer o®ers v t to legislators in L t nL tj in an identical fashion, and 0 to all other members of type t. QED Proof of Remark. It is su±cient to show that for each type t there exists an interior average recognition probability q t such that v t = w t =w. Adapting from (1),
In any such equilibrium, v t = w=w ¡ v t , and thus:
q t = w ¡w t w ¡w t :
Since w > w > w t , q t 2 (0; 1).
Mixed proposal strategies satisfying q t are derived analogously to those in the proofs of For each weighted voting game, the¯rst line gives Shapley-Shubik indices, second line gives Banzhaf indices, and third line gives the expected payo®s from equilibrium of legislative bargaining game. a = non-homogeneous game b = corner-solution in legislative bargaining game 
